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Abstract
We describe how FIDO and W3C VCs can 
overcome the problems of existing identity man-
agement systems. We describe our conceptual 
model and architecture, and the protocol we used 
by extending FIDO’s UAF in order to provide both 
strong authentication and strong authorization. 
We built a pilot implementation for U.K. NHS 
patients to validate our implementation. Patients 
were able to use a mobile phone with a fingerprint 
reader to access restricted NHS sites in order to 
make and cancel appointments and order repeat 
prescription drugs. Our initial user trials with 10 
U.K. NHS patients found the system to be easy 
to use, and fingerprints to be preferable to using 
usernames and passwords for authentication.
Introduction
Today’s federated identity management (FIM) sys-
tems have a number of weaknesses. Architecturally 
they are flawed by placing the identity provider 
(IdP) at the center of the identity ecosystem. IdPs 
are privacy-invasive, tracking every user login. They 
are also honeypots as the recent Facebook hack 
[1] showed, by providing the attacker with login to
every service provider (SP) where the user had an
account. Furthermore, redirection by the SP to the
IdP allows malicious SPs to phish users’ login user-
names and passwords. IdPs typically issue short-
lived bearer identity assertions [2] or tokens [3],
which can be stolen and used by an attacker. The
FIM trust model is also flawed as it requires the IdP
to trust the SP to preserve the privacy of the user’s
identity attributes that it is asserting, and the SP
to trust that the IdP is the authoritative source of
(usually all of) the user’s identity attributes, which
no IdP typically is. Consequently, IdPs are not will-
ing or able to release all the user attributes that
SPs require for fine-grained authorization. “Insuf-
ficient attribute release by IdPs is considered by
user communities as the major problem today in
the eduGAIN space” [4]. This necessitates the pull-
ing of user identity attributes from other attribute
authorities, and to solve this “attribute aggregation”
problem, some IdPs assign a persistent globally
unique correlating identifier to each user [5, 6].
Finally, IdPs release all the user’s attributes at login
time, before the service is chosen, thereby provid-
ing maximum rather than least privileges.
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Veri-
fiable Credentials (VC) Data Model [3] overcomes 
the above weaknesses. First, it places the user at 
the center of the identity ecosystem (Fig. 1). Now 
the IdPs issue cryptographically protected VCs to 
the user, who stores them and releases them to 
SPs when needed. VCs are not bearer tokens and 
thus cannot be stolen. No redirection exists, so 
phishing and IdP tracking are negated. IdPs are 
not aware of which SP the user is contacting. Sec-
ond, the trust model only requires the SP to trust 
the IdPs. Thus, the user can present multiple VCs 
from multiple IdPs to the SP as required, enabling 
attribute aggregation and fine-grained least privi-
leges access. However, the W3C is only standard-
izing the VC data model, and no VC protocols are 
currently being proposed.
In contrast, the Fast Identity Online (FIDO) Alli-
ance specified two authentication frameworks 
and protocols: the Universal Authentication 
Framework (UAF) for password-less authenti-
cation from smart devices [7], and the Univer-
sal Second Factor protocol (U2F) for two-factor 
authentication using a small hardware token to 
accompany a non-FIDO smart device having a 
FIDO-compliant web browser. Both operated on 
the same underlying principle of using asymmetric 
encryption for authentication, and both have now 
been combined into the W3C Web Authentica-
tion Recommendation (FIDO2) [2]. While FIDO2 
provides strong authentication, it does not pro-
vide authorization, so we combined the FIDO 
UAF and W3C VC architectures and extended 
the UAF protocol to provide strong authentication 
and authorization. This generic architecture and 
protocol was then implemented and validated in 
a prototype application for the NHS, and tested 
at a U.K. hospital with 10 patients.
W3C Verifiable Credentials
A VC is defined in [3] as a set of one or more 
tamper-resistant claims made by an issuer, where 
each claim asserts a set of properties (viz: identity 
attributes) about a subject. The architectural com-
ponents of the VC model are shown in Fig. 1.
The subject creates one or more globally 
unique identifiers, which are stored in a verifiable 
data registry. The holder, who in most cases is the 
subject,1 asks the issuer (cf. IdP) to create a VC 
for a subject by binding her identity attributes to 
an identifier. The issuer verifies the holder, its right 
to hold the subject’s VC, the identifier, and the 
attributes (perhaps via some out-of-band means), 
and then issues the VC. The holder stores the 
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1 In special cases someone 
other than the subject may 
hold the VC. For example, a 
parent may hold the VC of a 
child. A relative may hold a 
prescription VC of a patient.
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VC in its digital wallet for subsequent use. Hold-
ers present verifiable presentations to verifiers 
by combining one or more VCs together (i.e., 
attribute aggregation). Note that holders do not 
reveal the verifiers to the issuers.
FIDO UAF/FIDO2
All FIDO UAF devices contain one or more FIDO 
authenticators — a secure entity within the device 
that can create and store asymmetric key pairs and 
can authenticate the user before allowing access 
to the keys. User authentication is via one or more 
methods supported by the device including fin-
gerprints, face recognition, PIN, and so on. When 
a user first purchases a FIDO-ready smart device, 
they must register with it, which requires them to 
authenticate to the device’s authenticator using 
the method(s) it supports. All FIDO UAF authenti-
cators contain an attestation private key, inserted 
by the manufacturer, which is used to create trust 
in the public keys they create. The FIDO Alliance 
recommends that the same attestation private key 
is inserted into around 100,000 authenticators in 
order to protect the user’s privacy (so there is no 
unique key associated with the user which would 
become a globally unique correlating ID). All FIDO 
servers store the corresponding attestation public 
key certificates, obtained from the metadata ser-
vice (Fig. 2). FIDO2 has broadened the attestation 
trust model to allow for self-attestation, no attesta-
tion, and CA-based attestation.
FIDO2 creates a new asymmetric key pair for 
each web site to which the user authenticates. 
FIDO has adopted the Same Origin Policy (SOP) 
to ensure that the user’s client will only transfer 
signed data between web pages of the same web 
site. When the user first contacts a web site via 
TLS, the FIDO server issues a registration request 
containing its authentication policy. This lists the 
FIDO authenticators it trusts. The FIDO client asks 
the user for consent, then calls the authenticator 
to create a new key pair for this site. The authen-
ticator returns the public key to the FIDO server 
signed by its attestation private key. Finally, the 
FIDO server validates the response and stores the 
user’s public key in its database.
When the user wishes to login again, her client 
makes a TLS connection to the web site, and the 
FIDO server sends an authentication request mes-
sage containing a challenge and its authentication 
policy. The client calls its authenticator to respond 
to the challenge. Once the user has authenticated 
to the authenticator and consented, it signs the 
challenge with the private key for this site and 
returns the authentication response. The site now 
knows that it is the same user that originally regis-
tered with it, but not who this user is. This is the 
reason we have extended the FIDO UAF architec-
ture to provide identification using W3C VCs.
The FIDO Universal 
Authentication and 
Authorization Framework
The preconditions for our FIDO Universal Authen 
tication and Authorization Framework (UAAF) (Fig. 
3) are that each credential issuer (IdP) is FIDO-en-
abled, has a key pair for signing credentials (PrKAA,
PuKAA), and the public key PuKAA is distributed
securely out-of-band to the SPs (web sites) who
are FIDO-enabled and who trust this IdP to assert 
its particular identity attribute(s). Each user has a 
FIDO-ready smart device and has registered with it.
User Registration
IdPs typically know the identities of their users 
and which identity attributes to assign to them. 
There are no privacy issues involved in an IdP 
issuing VCs to a user whose identity it already 
knows, and it has no knowledge where the user 
may subsequently present these VCs. To register 
for VCs, the user may physically present herself to 
the IdP while in possession of her FIDO device. 
Alternatively, she may already have a username 
and password for the IdP’s web site, or a one-
time password (OTP) could be sent by post to 
her home address. Either way, the user establish-
es a TLS connection to the IdP’s web site, which 
causes it to issue a registration request, and the 
authenticator of the user’s device to create a new 
key pair (PrKUAA, PuKUAA) for the IdP. The attest-
ed public key, signPrKAtt{PuKUAA}, is passed to the 
Figure 1.  Verifiable credentials architecture.
Figure 2. The FIDO UAF architecture.
FIDO client, which passes it to the IdP’s web site 
and simultaneously to our new FIDO authoriza-
tion module, which records the public key to IdP 
mapping in its database. The IdP web site binds 
the user’s public key to the user’s identity and the 
attribute(s) that it is willing to assert for this user.
The IdP uses the TLS session to send a new 
FIDO UAAF protocol message to the authorization 
module of the FIDO device, listing the attribute(s) 
that it is willing to insert in VCs for the user. The 
user either agrees to these or selects a subset of 
them. Both the FIDO authorization module and 
IdP store the user’s VC attribute selection.
IdP o User:  Attribute1…Attributen (1)
User o IdP:  Attributei…Attributej  (2)
Authorization at a  
Web Site (SP)
The SP prepares its authorization policies for the 
various services it offers. Each protected URL can 
have a different policy, as this allows the principle 
of least privileges to be adopted. Each authoriza-
tion policy says which attributes from which IdPs 
are needed to access this resource. This policy is 
written in either disjunctive normal form (DNF) or 
conjunctive normal form (CNF) as these can repre-
sent any attribute-based access control policy [8].
An extension to the FIDO Metadata Service/
Verifiable Data Registry may store the public keys 
and assertable attributes of the FIDO-enabled IdPs. 
Different communities can define different metada-
ta extensions. Note that a metadata extension may 
contain more IdPs than any particular SP needs. 
There is no requirement for an SP to trust any of 
them as each SP makes its own trust decisions 
when formulating its authorization policies. Howev-
er, the registry provides a reliable way of obtaining 
the information about those IdPs that it does trust.
When a user first contacts an SP’s protected 
resource, the SP issues the standard FIDO registra-
tion request, and her device’s FIDO authenticator 
creates a new key pair for the SP, that is, (PrKUSP, 
PuKUSP). The authenticator signs the public key with 
the attestation private key, that is, signPrKAtt{PuKUSP}, 
and this is returned to the SP via the FIDO client. 
Both the SP and the FIDO authorization module 
record this public key. Note that the SP only knows 
that this public key is associated with some user, but 
knows nothing further about the identity of the user 
(unless she has presented some self-asserted attri-
butes). The SP now sends its authorization policy to 
the FIDO authorization module:
SP o User:  AuthzPolicy (3)
The FIDO authorization module looks in its 
database (a.k.a. digital wallet) to see if the authori-
zation policy can be matched by the attributes the 
user has already selected for assertion by her IdPs. 
If not, it tells the user she cannot proceed until 
she first registers with the IdPs that the SP trusts 
to issue the required attributes. Assuming the user 
already has the required VCs, the FIDO authoriza-
tion module asks the user to confirm that it is okay 
to send the matching attributes2 to the web site.
The FIDO client now performs a standard 
FIDO authentication exchange with the first IdP’s 
VC issuing URL, and sends a new FIDO claim 
request message to the IdP. The claim request is 
passed to the FIDO authenticator to be signed 
by the private key created for this origin, that 
is, PrKUAA, thereby obeying the SOP. The claim 
request3 comprises the following information:
User
IdP :SignPrKUAA
Attribute
1
,…Attribute
n
,
nonce1,timestamp






(4)
The IdP validates the signature, and checks that 
the timestamp is valid and that nonce1 has not been 
used before. The IdP looks up the user’s entry in 
its database, determines which attribute(s) this user 
has consented to release, and compares this to the 
attributes that are being requested. Assuming these 
are a subset of the consented set, the IdP returns a 
second nonce to the user along with nonce1, both 
encrypted with the user’s public key, viz
IdP o User:{nonce1,nonce2}encPuKUAA (5)
This ensures that only the user can obtain 
nonce2. The authorization module asks the authen-
ticator to decrypt message (5), and to sign two 
public keys, the IdP’s and the SP’s, that is, {PuKUSP, 
PuKUAA}, with the attestation private key, to prove 
that both keys belong to the same user; other-
wise, it would be possible for one user to pass on 
the public key of a second user. The authoriza-
tion module packages the attested keys with the 
decrypted nonce2, adds a timestamp, and asks the 
authenticator to sign this credential request mes-
sage3 for the IdP before sending it to the IdP, viz
User IdP :
SignPrKUAA
Sign
Pr K
Att PuK
USP
,PuK
UAA{ }
nonce2,timestamp






(6)
The IdP validates the signatures on the cre-
dential request and public keys, and from nonce2 
Figure 3. The FIDO UAAF architecture.
2 If the user has more that 
one IdP capable of issuing 
the web site’s required 
attribute(s) (e.g., assume 
a MasterCard attribute is 
requested and the user has 
two issuing banks), the user 
will be asked to choose and 
consent to just one of them.
3 This message requires an 
update to the UAF ASM 
application programming 
interface (API) commands, as 
it is a new signed-object. The 
current FIDO specifications 
do not allow extension data 
passed to the authenticator 
to be signed. Consequently 
in our proof of concept 
implementation this message 
is not signed.
knows which attribute request message it is linked 
to. The IdP now issues a set of VCs for the user by 
associating each requested attribute with her pub-
lic key for the SP. Issuing VCs at the granularity of 
an attribute ensures selective disclosure if the user 
stores them in her wallet and uses  them again in 
different aggregations.
The IdP returns the set of VCs to the user’s 
authorization module. Each VC comprises the 
public key of the user for the web site, PuKUSP, 
the validity time (start and end times), and one of 
the attributes, and is signed by the private key of 
the IdP, viz
IdP o User: credential1, … credentialn  (7)
where credentiali = 
SignPrKAA{PuKUSP, Attributei, startTime, endTime}
Upon receiving the set of VCs, the authoriza-
tion module checks the signatures, and if the VCs 
are authentic, stores them in its wallet until their 
endTimes, after which they are discarded.
The authorization module now repeats steps (4) 
to (7) for each IdP from the SP’s authorization pol-
icy. This provides attribute aggregation. Once the 
authorization module has received all the VCs that 
are needed by the SP, it creates an Authorization 
Response message (i.e., a Verifiable Presentation) 
and passes this to the authenticator for signing2. 
The Authorization Response message comprises
User o SP:  SignPrKUSP{credential1, …, credentialn}
(8)
The SP validates the signatures, and from this 
knows:
• Some user, identified by the public key
PuKUSP, possesses the corresponding private
key PrKUSP.
• This same user has a set of VCs issued by a
set of trusted IdPs, because they all contain
the same public key.
• All the VCs were valid when they were issued
and are still within their validity period (revo-
cation is discussed below).
The SP does not know anything further about
the identity of the user, unless she has present-
ed some self-asserted attributes as well. Finally, 
the web site checks that the presented set of VCs 
matches its authorization policy, and if it does, 
grants the user access to its protected resource.
Re-Authorization and 
Revocation
If the user returns to the same SP, the authoriza-
tion service can retrieve unexpired VCs from its 
wallet and send these to the SP, instead of asking 
the IdP to create fresh ones. There are two alter-
native VC expiration models that can be adopted 
by the IdP: revocation or short-lived.
In the revocation model, the IdP issues long-
lived VCs that can be used multiple times over 
many months, but the IdP can revoke the VCs. Dif-
ferent revocation schemes have been proposed, 
including OCSP, CRL, CRT [9], and so on. From 
a privacy perspective, we recommend third-party 
merged revocation lists, to prevent the IdP indirect-
ly tracking the user. To minimize CRL retrieval, the 
SP should have a maximum validity period (MaxVP) 
and only retrieve the CRL once per MaxVP. Anoth-
er option is to use OCSP Stapling [10], where users 
periodically retrieve signed validity status state-
ments (VSSs) from IdPs and store them in their 
devices. Users present their VCs and associated 
VSSs to the SP. However, using OCSP stapling is 
very similar to the short-lived model, but is more 
complex, so is not recommended.
In the short-lived model, the IdP issues short-
lived VCs and does not perform revocation. Users 
may reuse VCs during their short validity period, 
but will need to fetch new VCs more frequently. 
Which model to use depends on the nature of the 
VC. Some VCs, such as date of birth, are naturally 
long lived. Others, such as permission to enter a 
high security area, are naturally short lived.
If any VCs are not acceptable to the SP, either 
because they have been revoked or are stale, it 
notifies the user about the VCs it is unwilling to 
accept, using the following message:
SP o User:  credential1, o , credentialn (9)
Issuer Delegation of Authority
Delegation of authority increases the scalabili-
ty of privilege management by distributing the 
users between multiple IdPs rather than a single 
IdP (the Source of Authority, SoA). Both down-
ward and upward delegation mechanisms exist. 
An example of the former is the issuing of credit 
cards by banks, and of the latter is the issuing of 
national student cards in the United Kingdom by 
the National Union of Students.
In the downward delegation mechanism the 
metadata registry stores the public key of the SoA 
as well as a pointer to the SoA’s metadata ser-
vice. The latter contains a signed list of IdPs and 
their public keys, to which the SoA has delegated 
VC issuing. In this way the SoA can dynamically 
update its IdP list without effecting the main meta-
data service. Users register with one IdP and have 
their VCs issued by it. The SP, which trusts the 
SoA, can validate any of the issued VCs by check-
ing that the public key of the IdP that signed the 
VC has been signed by the SoA in its metadata. 
Two signature verifications now need to be per-
formed by the SP instead of one. However, the 
user experience remains the same, as does the 
VC and revocation issuing mechanisms.
In the upward delegation mechanism there is 
no need for an SoA metadata service. The IdPs 
delegate VC issuing to their SoA, which issues VCs 
on behalf of all the IdPs. An IdP’s primary task is to 
manage its users and their attribute entitlements. 
Consequently, the user must additionally register 
with the SoA. This process must contain an authen-
ticator known only to the user and the IdP, such 
as an OTP. The SoA contacts the user’s IdP by 
some proprietary means to validate the authenti-
cator and confirm that the user is entitled to the 
requested attribute(s) before issuing the VC. With 
this mechanism, the SP’s authorization procedure 
does not change, since it only trusts the SoA, and 
all credentials are issued (and revoked) by the SoA. 
However, the user’s registration procedure is more 
cumbersome and/or time consuming due to the 
double registration, and revocation involves com-
munication between the IdP and the SoA.
Delegation of authority 
increases the scalability 
of privilege management 
by distributing the users 
between multiple IdPs 
rather than a single IdP 
(the Source of Authority, 
SoA). Both downward and 
upward delegation mecha-
nisms exist. An example of 
the former is the issuing 
of credit cards by banks, 
and of the latter is the 
issuing of national student 
cards in the United King-
dom by the National Union 
of Students.
Abusive Users
Users who abuse their privileges by exploiting an 
SP can be immediately blocked by the SP black-
listing the user’s public key, PuKUSP. However, 
this does not stop the user from registering again 
with the SP and generating a new key pair. The 
privacy design of FIDO is such that the SP cannot 
tell when the same user is authenticating using 
a different public key. The solution is for the SP 
to contact the trusted IdPs who have asserted 
the VCs of the abusive user, and to inform them 
about the abuse and the public key that was used. 
Since the IdPs have records of the VCs they have 
issued, along with their public keys, they can iden-
tify the user. The IdPs can take appropriate action 
to revoke the privileges of the user, warn him, and 
so on without revealing the user’s identity to the 
SP. If the abuse is more serious, which requires 
criminal prosecution, an IdP could reveal the 
user’s identity to the SP if required by law.
The Implementation
We implemented the IdP and SP servers using the 
Spring framework by extending the UAF FIDO 
server provided by eBay [11]. We only issue short-
lived VCs, so no revocation service is needed. Both 
our SP and IdP support the three standard FIDO 
UAF REST services (regRequest, authnRequest, and 
uafResponse). Our IdP supports four additional 
REST services: attrList returns message (1), userSe-
lectedAttrList receives message (2), credentialsTo-
Certify receives message (4) and returns message 
(5), and credentials receives message (6) and 
returns message (7). Our SP supports two addi-
tional REST services: UAAFPolicyRequest returns 
message (3), and signedUAAFResponse receives 
message (8), and optionally returns message (9).
We leave the management of the first step 
of the initial user registration (identification and 
authentication) to the IdP. This gives the IdP flexi-
bility to choose the most suitable procedure, such 
as an OTP or physical presence.
Our UAAF client is implemented on both 
Android (version 6 and above) and iOS (10.1 and 
above). The software architecture on Android imple-
ments the FIDO Authenticator Specific Module 
(ASM) as a separate APK-packaged application, as 
suggested by the FIDO UAF documentation. The 
ASM protects the private keys in the Android Key-
Store system. On iOS, the UAAF and the ASM are 
bundled together in the same app due to inter-pro-
cess communication limitations, and private keys are 
stored in the device’s security enclave. Except for 
these technical differences, the core of the UAAF 
client is identical on both platforms. We extended 
the ASM to certify to the issuer that the authentica-
tor manages two keys — message (6) — to stop two 
users colluding and sharing an IdP’s issued VCs. The 
UAAF client stores the VCs in an SQLite database, 
allowing it to search for VCs that match the SP’s 
authorization policy.
Use Case and User Trials
Missed doctor and hospital appointments cost 
the English health service nearly £1 billion a year 
[12]. Changing an appointment by telephone is 
time consuming, so patients frequently give up. 
We gave patients a smartphone and our Nation-
al Health Service (NHS) app to allow them to 
instantly make and cancel hospital appointments 
and reorder repeat prescription drugs, another 
time-consuming process.
Patients were given a letter containing a ficti-
tious NHS number, a 24-digit OTP, and the NHS 
URL to contact. On accessing this URL with the 
phone’s browser, user registration takes place. A 
FIDO key pair is generated for the NHS IdP, and 
the user swipes her finger to confirm this (Fig. 4). 
The NHS number and OTP are transferred to the 
IdP, allowing it to authenticate the user. The IdP 
sends message (1) to the phone, and the user is 
shown the attribute(s) that are available (one in 
this case; Fig. 5a). The user chooses it, message (2) 
is returned to the IdP as a result, and the ability to 
obtain an NHS-Patient VC is recorded by the app.
The NHS will eventually offer many different 
online services, each requiring different VCs for 
fine-grained access control, so the patient must 
also get specific VCs for the specific NHS services 
she is using. In our use case, a hospital consul-
tant (Dr. Nijjar) has an online service for making 
and cancelling appointments and ordering repeat 
prescriptions. When the patient visits the consul-
tant, she is given a 4-character OTP, and asked to 
register with the consultant’s IdP at the given URL 
in order to obtain the Dr-Nijjar’s-Patient VC. The 
previous procedure is repeated with the new IdP. 
The patient now has the ability to obtain two VCs, 
one from the NHS and one from the consultant.
When the patient subsequently accesses the 
NHS hospital web site with her browser, she clicks 
the login button, which causes a new FIDO key pair 
to be generated. This will be used to authenticate 
the user in all subsequent exchanges. The hospital’s 
authorization policy is sent to the phone (message 
(3)), which asks for the NHS-Patient VC. The app 
matches the policy with the available VCs and asks 
the user to consent to the release of her NHS-Patient 
VC (Fig. 6a). The app fetches this VC from the NHS 
IdP (messages (4), (5), (6), and (7)), stores it on the 
Figure 4. a) FIDO device registration at the NHS; b) the fingerprint reader.
(a) (b)
phone, then signs it and sends it to hospital (mes-
sage (8)). After validating the VC, the hospital web 
site displays the online services that are available to 
all NHS patients. Clicking on any of these will cause 
the respective authorization policy to be sent to the 
phone. The user selects the Consultant service, and 
the policy asks for the Dr-Nijjar’s-Patient VC (Fig. 
6b). The app confirms that the patient has this VC 
available, and requests it from the consultant’s IdP. 
On receipt it is stored on the phone, signed, and 
sent to the web site, which validates it. A valid VC 
causes the site to display the three services that are 
available to the consultant’s patients: make a hospi-
tal appointment, cancel a hospital appointment, and 
order repeat prescriptions.
We evaluated the usability of the app with 
patients waiting to see their consultant at Uni-
versity Hospital Southampton. We simply asked 
patients on arrival if they would like to trial a 
new mobile phone NHS app while waiting. We 
observed their behavior and made notes. When 
they finished, we asked them to complete a ques-
tionnaire, while we re-initialized the phone for 
the next patient. During the trial, the patient’s 
fingerprints were protected from direct access 
and extraction by the native Android security 
mechanisms, and the smartphone was re-initial-
ized immediately after the trial to remove all data 
related to the patient.
The questionnaire contained 10 questions 
that used a five-point Likert scale to ask about 
the usability, security, and privacy of the app. 
Four subsequent questions asked what the users 
thought about the app, and three questions cap-
tured their demographic information. Ten patients 
of three different ethnicities tested the app (9 
female, 1 male) with ages ranging from under 20 
to over 80. Only one patient had insufficient time 
to complete the questionnaire. 
Prior to starting, each user was given a doc-
ument explaining the background and setting 
the scene. For each task we had a set of written 
instructions to give to patients who got stuck. We 
wanted to see how intuitive the whole procedure 
was without any help being provided.
Observations and Discussion
Most users (9/10) had problems registering their 
fingerprint with the phone, and hence obtained 
further instructions for this. This was not unsur-
prising, as none of the users already owned the 
Motorola phone being tested. However, once 
given the instructions, all users found it easy or 
very easy to do. At the end of the trial, 9/10 users 
said they liked the use of fingerprints instead of 
username/passwords very much, and said they 
would always use the app if the NHS made it avail-
able. Seven free-form positive comments were 
provided and no negative ones. 5/10 thought fin-
gerprints made the app more secure and 2/10 
less secure. One elderly patient had problems typ-
ing in the 24-character OTP (Fig. 4a). She kept 
touching characters on the virtual keyboard next 
to the correct one, making the OTP incorrect. 
The observer eventually had to enter the OTP for 
her. In a live system the NHS will have to consider 
how best to balance usability and security, as we 
had erred on the side of security.
Most users (9/10) had problems getting a 
patient VC from the NHS because the screen was 
poorly designed (Fig. 5a), so they obtained the 
instructions. After this, all users found it easy or 
very easy to do. We subsequently redesigned this 
screen (Fig. 5b). 
Only one of the 10 had problems the second 
time around (i.e., getting a VC from the consul-
tant) because a) this was a repeat procedure and 
b) the (pretend) consultant was present to help
them if they got stuck. The patient who had diffi-
culty was not helped by the (pretend) consultant
so (s)he requested the instructions.
About half the patients (6/10) had problems 
booking an appointment and hence requested 
further instructions. This was because the hospi-
tal welcome page (which we had copied) had 
a Sign In button that was small and easily over-
looked. Below this were a set of quick links, one 
being “Cancel your appointment,” so naturally 
the patients looked for “Book your appointment,” 
which did not exist. Once the sign-in problem 
was overcome, booking an appointment was very 
easy. We subsequently redesigned this screen by 
making Sign In more obvious and removing “Can-
cel your appointment.” 
The Repeat Prescription form listed the 
patient’s drugs and had an Order button at the 
bottom of the page below the visible screen, so 
a few patients did not understand that they had 
to scroll down the screen. One patient asked for 
additional instructions. After the trials, we rede-
signed the screen by placing the Order button 
above the list of drugs.
Overall, we were extremely pleased with 
these (albeit limited) patient trials, because they 
employed a good cross-section of the population 
in age, and involved different ethnic origins and 
genders (although predominantly female). The 
trials found a few sub-optimal design features in 
the app that we subsequently corrected, but the 
patients unanimously liked the app, found it easy 
Figure 5. Attribute choice: a) original design; b) design after the trials.
(a) (b)
to use, preferred fingerprints to usernames and 
passwords, and were more than satisfied with its 
security and privacy preserving properties.
Discussion, Limitations, 
Further Work
Our user trials are limited and insufficient to gen-
eralize from, so more are needed.
The number of issued VCs can be large, as 
each attribute is issued for each SP. However, 
this is likely to be smaller than the number of 
assertions a typical SAML IdP will issue, as it has 
to issue a fresh assertion each time the user initi-
ates a session with the SP. Our VCs can be reused 
multiple times.
The authorization module will need to store a 
large number of VCs, but since a single attribute 
VC in JSON-LD is smaller than 1 kB, the total stor-
age for 2500 VCs will be less than 2.5 MB, which 
is easily manageable on today’s smartphones.
We are currently migrating our implementa-
tion to FIDO2 [4].
Further work is needed to define the attributes 
that user communities will use for identification 
and authorization purposes. It is essential that 
IdPs and SPs have a common understanding of 
these attributes, so an ontology will be helpful, 
with class hierarchies and membership lists. Inter-
nationally standardized VCs, for example, mobile 
driving licenses and credit cards, will aid the uni-
versal recognition of VCs.
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Figure 6. Display of the SP’s matched authorization policy for: a) the hospital; 
b) the consultant service.
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